As a result, the "every company has been hacked" theme has become a popular refrain in discussions about cybersecurity. In 2011, Dimitri Alperovitch, a former McAfee employee who later founded the cybersecurity company, CrowdStrike, wrote, "I am convinced that every company in every conceivable industry with significant size and valuable intellectual property and trade secrets has been compromised (or will be shortly), with the great majority of the victims rarely discovering the intrusion or its impact." 2 In a speech at the 2012 RSA conference, then FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III said, "I am convinced that there are only two types of companies: those that have been hacked and those that will be. And even they are converging into one category: companies that have been hacked and will be hacked again ." 3 So what should companies do? First, and most obviously, companies need to take all reasonable steps to minimize the ability of cyber-intruders to get into their systems and make off with their trade secrets. There is a multibillion-dollar industry of products and services available to help plug security holes, and many companies have made cybersecurity a top priority. large part this is because, unlike the other three types of IP, trade secrets derive value through the very lack of disclosure that helps define them. 5 And for this very same reason, they are particularly attractive targets for cyberintruders. 6 Trade secrets are also different from other forms of IP in that when they make the news, it is often because a company knows or suspects that something has gone wrong. Trademarks are advertised, copyrighted works are marketed, and patents are featured in company press releases, product announcements, and on products themselves. By contrast, trade secrets are often described in news stories related to trade secret theft allegations, civil litigation, and criminal prosecutions. 7 As a result, while there is plenty of information regarding how companies should respond to detected or suspected incidents of trade secret misappropriation, there is very little guidance on how to minimize the impact of the undetected incidents that probably constitute the vast majority of attacks. To help fill that gap, this article proposes a set of recommendations for handling trade secrets in a world where legal protections against misappropriation are weak in many jurisdictions and cybersecurity everywhere is imperfect at best. To properly frame those recommendations, this article begins with an explanation of trade secrets and an overview of the associated legal frameworks.
II. TRADE SECRETS: A PRIMER
A trade secret is information that derives actual or potential economic value from not being generally known, and that is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. http://www.law360.com/articles/634744/diablo-owes-netlist-6-5m-for-chip-secrettheft-jury-told.
8 This definition is paraphrased from the definition in the Uniform Law Commission's Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which in full reads as follows: "'Trade secret' means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable can all be trade secrets.
9
Perhaps the most famous trade secret is the Coca-Cola formula, which is reportedly held in a vault in Atlanta. 10 Other famous trade secrets include the Google search algorithm 11 and the recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken. 12 The details of a manufacturing process can be a trade secret, 13 as can the breakdown of ingredients used by a perfume company to create a fragrance.
14 Trade secrets are arguably the most foundational form of intellectual property. Undisclosed plans, designs, formulas, methods, processes, procedures, and computer code play a vital role in economic competitiveness, both for specific companies and, by extension, for entire countries.
15
Even patented inventions begin as trade secrets. When a company creates internal documents describing a new invention in anticipation of a possible patent filing, much of the information by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985) in those documents qualifies, at least temporarily, as a trade secret.
16
If a company elects not to file a patent application, the information can remain a trade secret. 17 If a patent application is filed, however, the information in the application could retain trade secret value until it is published, typically eighteen months later.
18
Trade secrets also have a connection to copyright.
19
Although a published work is disclosed, the processes used by a movie or television studio, book publisher, or record label to foster the creation of copyrighted works and to 
III. AMERICAN TRADE SECRET LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
In the U.S., statutory protection for trade secrets is found in most states, 37 and in the case of economic espionage, at the federal level.
38
All but a few states have enacted civil trade secret statutes 39 based on the Uniform Law Commission's ("ULC") Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), 40 which was initially approved by the ULC in 1979 and revised in 1985. 41 Under the UTSA, a trade secret:
[M]eans information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
42
Acquisition of a trade secret through improper means, or improper disclosure of a trade secret can constitute misappropriation. 43 Importantly, acquisition and disclosure are not necessarily linked. Someone who employs improper means (such as breaking into a computer system) to obtain a trade secret but who does not subsequently disclose it to anyone else is still committing misappropriation (and potentially other crimes as well). 44 Notably, there is no current federal civil trade secret statute. Companies wishing to pursue a civil trade secret claim in the U.S. can face a complex landscape because many states have not yet adopted the language in the UTSA verbatim.
45
This disparity has led to differences among states in the scope of trade secret protection.
46
In addition, each state has a separate body of trade secret case law. 47 42 Unif. Trade Secret Act § 1(4). 43 The full definition of "misappropriation" in the UTSA is: "(i) [A]cquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake." Id. §1(2). Trade secrets are addressed in federal criminal statutes through the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), 49 which was enacted in 1996, and indirectly through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 50 which was enacted in 1986. The EEA addresses trade secret theft that would "benefit any foreign government," and more generally, for "the economic benefit of anyone other than the [trade secret] owner . . . ."
51
In 2012, the scope of the EEA was expanded to cover trade secret misappropriation "related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce" 52 Prior to this change, the EEA covered trade secrets "included in a product that is produced for or placed in" commerce, which arguably excluded from protection trade secrets related to not-yetreleased products, or used internally in a manner unrelated to products.
53
In 2013, the fines for trade secret theft under the EEA were increased.
54
The CFAA makes it a crime to access a computer "without authorization or exceed [ing] Hewlett-Packard's ("HP") 2013 Cyber Risk Report noted that over 4700 new vulnerabilities were reported during the period from January 2013 through November 2013, and that this number was about six percent lower than the new vulnerabilities reported for the same period in 2012. 85 Stated another way, the number of reported new vulnerabilities averages well over ten per day; the number of unreported new vulnerabilities is clearly higher. 86 The HP report also cited approximately 250 vulnerabilities disclosed in 2013 through HP's Zero Day Initiative, which provides compensation to researchers who disclose verified vulnerabilities, and then coordinates the release of patches by the affected product vendor. 87 In addition, cyberespionage attacks are notable both for their sophistication and their increasing frequency. The Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report 88 examined 511 cyber-espionage incidents in 2013, noting "consistent, significant growth of incidents in the dataset" and that cyberespionage "exhibits a wider variety of threat actions than any other pattern."
89
It is also important to note that not all incidents of cyber-related trade secret misappropriation are due to external attacks. 90 An insider who attempts to access thousands of trade secret documents in the days before moving to a new job at a competing company is engaging in behavior that, at the very least, is highly suspicious. In a well-designed and well-managed corporate network, patterns of 84 insider document access indicative of potential trade secret misappropriation will immediately be flagged and investigated.
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Against this backdrop, companies should make securing their trade secrets a top priority. The good news is that many have, and corporate systems today are generally far more secure than in the past. Information regarding best practices is readily available,
91
as are a growing array of cybersecurity products and services: according to Gartner, global "security software" revenue was $19.9 billion in 2013.
92
But cybersecurity is an arms race, and no matter how well companies attempt to protect their networks, cyberintruders will still sometimes manage to penetrate company systems and make off with trade secrets. 93 In light of that reality, here are some recommendations that can help companies manage trade secrets.
A.

Recommendation 1: Companies Should Segment Both Their Networks and the Trade Secret Information on Those Networks
Simultaneously segmenting both trade secrets and the networks on which they are stored can be vital to impeding cyber-enabled trade secret theft. Segmentation distributes information so that no single cybersecurity breach exposes enough of a trade secret to allow the attacker to obtain the full set of information needed to replicate a targeted invention, product, or service.
94
In the context of manufacturing, the value of segmenting trade secrets is well understood.
95
Through segmentation, a manufacturing process can be partitioned But segmentation does not need to be limited to manufacturing, nor does it need to be limited to managing information shared with third parties. It can also be applied more broadly to how trade secrets are stored and used on a company's own networks. 97 For example, consider a company that uses a series of sophisticated algorithms that are run on the company's servers to deliver a service to consumers through a smartphone app. The source code associated with different components of those algorithms could be stored and accessed in a manner that minimizes the likelihood that the entire set of source code could be accessed by a cyberintruder who manages to penetrate one of the company's networks. More fundamentally, the structure of the code can be designed in a modular manner that specifically facilitates partitioned storage that can increase cybersecurity.
98
Trade secrets should be analyzed to identify ways in which they can be partitioned into segments that can then be distributed only on a need-to-know basis, both within and outside a company. Computer code can be designed and tested in a modularized manner, minimizing the number of computers on which the entire set of source code is stored. 99 Companies engaged in chip design can also leverage the modular structure of most chips by limiting the number of locations where information about the full design is stored. Access to internal databases of customer lists and other sensitive information can be structured to minimize the proliferation of copies when that information is accessed. "Negative information," which is the term used in trade secret law to describe information about what doesn't work-often obtained through extensive, costly -can often be stored in a very limited set of locations because it does not need to be frequently accessed.
Employees have a key role in implementing trade secret segmentation. Employees should be made aware of the value of segmentation and be encouraged to store and exchange trade secret information only to the extent necessary to do their jobs. In addition, employees can actively help identify ways to segment information in ways that promote robustness to breaches without compromising efficiency.
With respect to computer networks, the cybersecurity advantages of segmentation, which aims to ensure that an attacker who has breached one part of a network cannot freely move through the entire network, are well recognized. As the Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report noted, "[g]ood network and role segmentation will do wonders for containing an incident, especially where actors intend to leverage access to one desktop as a stepping-stone to the entire network." 101 Segmenting both trade secrets and the networks on which they are stored can greatly reduce the utility of information accessible to cyberintruders.
B.
Recommendation 2 Most companies are quite careful about requiring nondisclosure agreements ("NDA") before revealing trade secrets to third parties, such as suppliers, partners, consultants, or attorneys. 102 NDAs, however, are commonly viewed as a legal box to be checked, as opposed to part of an overarching approach to managing trade secrets. In many cases, the disclosing party performs little or no diligence regarding the security practices of the party that will receive information under an NDA, and once an NDA is in place, companies often over- If a company's trade secrets are compromised in a cyberintrusion targeting a third party to whom those secrets have been disclosed, an NDA may be of little use. Although NDAs generally require third party recipients to exercise at least a reasonable degree of care in protecting information, a sufficiently sophisticated intrusion might circumvent even very strong security measures, giving the third party grounds to assert that it honored the NDA despite the compromise.
103
Not to mention, arguing about responsibility for a breach does nothing to recover the lost information. Furthermore, many sophisticated intrusions will simply go undetected, leaving both the trade secret owner and the third party partner none the wiser that the information has been compromised.
104
There are several steps that companies can take to better protect trade secrets shared with third parties. First, they can perform better diligence on third party cybersecurity practices and capabilities. As noted above, in many cases diligence is either absent altogether or perfunctory. Before agreeing to provide documents containing trade secrets under an NDA, a company should ask who will have access to the documents, where on the third party's networks and systems they will be stored, what measures the third party will take to ensure that the documents are only accessed on a need-to-know basis, and whether the third party will be willing to confirm that the documents have been erased once they are no longer needed. Where appropriate, information derived from the responses can be incorporated into the language of the NDA prior to its execution.
Second, companies can be more conservative in determining what to share. Too often, there is an assumption that once an NDA is in place, anything can be shared. The resulting tendency is to over-disclose needlessly and risk trade secret information that should have been kept in-house. For example, under an NDA companies will often provide documents that contain far more information than is necessary. This could involve providing a fifty-page document, of which only five pages are relevant to the discussions with the third party. While it takes more time, a far better approach is to perform a careful need-to-know analysis regarding materials to be shared, and when appropriate, to create revised versions of the documents containing only the information that the third party has a need to know.
Third, when sharing information with third parties, companies should consider strategically withholding certain information that may be less central to the work the third party is performing, but would lead to greater harms if compromised. Every piece of confidential information has a particular utility when used as intended by the third party, and every piece of information can be associated with a level of potential harm if it is misappropriated.
105
When the ratio of utility to potential harm is low, companies will often be better off withholding the information, even when an NDA has been signed.
C.
Recommendation 3: Companies Should Act More Quickly on Patentable Inventions
Recent changes to U.S. patent law have worsened the potential consequences of cybersecurity breaches that could allow a competitor to steal information relating to inventions not yet patented.
106
Put simply, there is an increased incentive for unethical actors to steal inventions and front-run the legitimate inventors in patent filings.
107
One simple way to reduce the probability of invention theft is to act quickly in decisions regarding whether to file for a patent or whether to maintain the invention as a trade secret. 108 Under the America Invents Act ("AIA"), the United States moved from a "firstto-invent" patent system to what is called, only partially accurately, a "first-tofile" system. 109 and in cases where companies are on the fence regarding which option to choose, cybersecurity considerations can bias decision-making away from trade secrets and in favor of patents.
127
When weighing the patent/trade secret decision, there are three different possibilities with respect to the duration of trade secret protection associated with information about the invention.
First, if a company elects not to file a patent application at all, the invention can remain a trade secret permanently-or until it is intentionally or unintentionally disclosed, 128 or independently developed by a third party.
129
Second, if the company elects to file a patent application without submitting a "nonpublication request," then the invention can remain a trade secret until the application is automatically published by the PTO eighteen months after the claimed priority date. 130 Of course, a company may choose to publicize the invention after filing the application without waiting until the end of the eighteen-month period, but in that event the company would lose trade secret status with respect to the disclosed information.
131
Third, if the company files a patent application with a non-publication request, the invention can remain a trade secret until the patent issues.
132
If the patent never issues, then the company can retain the invention as a trade secret.
133
Nonpublication requests are only available for inventions that have not been, and will not be in the future, the subject of a foreign patent application.
134
In practice, only a minority of companies choose this third approach, because a nonpublication request eliminates the opportunity to pursue foreign patents, and removes the ability to assert provisional rights domestically with respect to the published claims in the pending application.
135
Companies choosing among these options should perform an assessment of the difficulties associated with protecting a particular trade secret over the long term. This requires an understanding of who within and outside a company will have access to the trade secret, where it will be stored, and the extent to which it can be subjected to partitioning or other steps that would protect the trade secret during a network compromise. The extent of the challenge depends in part on the nature of the trade secret. A trade secret that, in the process of being used, ends up stored in human-readable form (as opposed to non-readable compiled code) on hundreds of different computers, including the personal smartphones of company employees, probably will not stay secret for very long. If the trade secret covers patent-eligible subject matter, companies should consider a patent application. On the other hand, a trade secret that can be tightly controlled will 130 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012 Commercially using a trade secret that might later be patented by a competitor has advantages. As stated above, many trade secrets are patent-eligible, and there is nothing to stop a competitor from independently inventing and patenting the same trade secret. Thanks to a new "prior user rights" feature of patent law, if the competitor sues for patent infringement, the company that independently-and at an earlier date-developed the same trade secret, a sufficiently early commercial use of the trade secret can prevent a finding of infringement.
137
As Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX), one of the sponsors of the patent reform legislation in 2011, explained, the "inclusion of prior user rights is essential to ensure that those who have invented and used a technology but choose not to disclose that technology-generally to ensure that they do not disclose their trade secrets to foreign competitors-are provided a defense against someone who later patents the technology." g., Revisting Buffett: Coca-Cola in 1988 , GURUFOCUS (Jan. 19, 2013 ), http://www.gurufocus.com/news/205476/revisiting-buffett--cocacola-in-1988 (showing that the maintained secrecy of Coca-Cola's formula resulted in annual incomes that more than doubled between 1979 and 1988). 137 The expanded prior commercial use defense to infringement in the AIA only applies to patents on "subject matter consisting of a process, or consisting of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter used in a manufacturing or other commercial process" issued on or after September 16, 2011. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012). In addition, prior user rights generally do not apply to patents covering a university invention See id. § 273(c)(2). And, the prior commercial use defense only applies if the commercial use occurred sufficiently early. See id. § 273(a)(2).
